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Honorable Thomas N. O’Neill, Jr., Senior United States District Judge for the*
Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation
NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                              
No. 07-3171
                              
SAMUEL CLAYTON, JR., M.D.
Appellant
v.
PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF WELFARE, by and though their Agent,
Estelle Richman, Secretary, Department of Public Welfare;
HARRISBURG STATE HOSPITAL, by and through their agent, Dr. Ann Shemo,
Medical Director, PA Department of Public Welfare,
Harrisburg State Hospital
                              
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 05-cv-00768)
District Judge: Honorable John E. Jones, III
                              
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
December 2, 2008
                              
Before: AMBRO and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges, 
and O’NEILL,  District Judge*
(Opinion filed: December 22, 2008)
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OPINION
                              
AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
Samuel Clayton, Jr., M.D. appeals the District Court’s grant of summary judgment
to Estelle Richman, Ann Shemo, M.D., and the Pennsylvania Department of Public
Welfare on (1) his claim of racial discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and the Pennsylvania
Human Relations Act (“PHRA”), 43 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 951 et seq.; (2) his retaliation
claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, Title VII, and the PHRA; and (3) his hostile work
environment and constructive discharge claims.  For the following reasons, we affirm.
I.
Because we write only for the benefit of the parties, our recitation of the facts is
brief.  Dr. Clayton is an African-American physician who was employed part-time from
1985 until his retirement in 2003 at Harrisburg State Hospital (“the Hospital”), a mental
health facility operated by the Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare.  Estelle
Richman is and has been the Secretary of Public Welfare in Pennsylvania since 2003.  Dr.
Ann Shemo was the Medical Director at Harrisburg State Hospital from March 2000 until
September 2004.
Dr. Clayton filed a charge with the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission in
February 2001 alleging an improper change in his work schedule.  In March 2001, he
filed an amended charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
3(“EEOC”), complaining of multiple discriminatory incidents.  The EEOC issued a right-
to-sue letter in January 2005, after which Dr. Clayton filed his complaint in the District
Court.
In his complaint, Dr. Clayton claimed that he suffered the following individual
incidents of discrimination and retaliation between 1999 and 2003: (1) the Hospital
reduced his on-call time after a brief period of equalizing on-call hours between full-time
and part-time physicians; (2) the Hospital advised him that he might be furloughed to
make way for another physician; (3) the Hospital changed his work schedule in a way that
interfered with his private practice; (4) the Hospital, at the direction of Dr. Shemo, moved
his mailbox to a new administrative building approximately one month before moving all
other physicians’ mailboxes; (5) the Hospital denied him a specialty board certification
bonus; (6) the Hospital removed a second desk from his office for restoration without
requesting his consent; (7) Dr. Shemo did not provide him with the specific office she had
promised to him; (8) the Hospital neglected to pay him step-cash payments; and (9) the
Hospital failed to respond timely to filed grievances.  See Clayton v. Pennsylvania Dep’t
of Public Welfare, No. 4:CV 05-0768, 2007 WL 575677, *2–4 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 20, 2007).
The District Court rejected all of Dr. Clayton’s claims.  As a preliminary matter, it
dismissed Ms. Richman as a party, limited Dr. Shemo’s liability to claims under § 1981,
and dismissed Dr. Clayton’s PHRA and § 1981 claims against the Department of Public
Welfare.  See id. at *4–6.  The Court also concluded that all of Dr. Clayton’s PHRA
claims, with the exception of his change in work schedule allegation, were barred for
4failure to exhaust.  See id. at *7–8.  It determined as well that the statute of limitations
barred Dr. Clayton’s Title VII on-call-hours claim and all but three of his § 1981 claims. 
See id. at *14–15.
Addressing the merits of Dr. Clayton’s discrimination and retaliation claims
(including those barred by statute), the District Court held that Dr. Clayton could not
make out a prima facie case because he could not establish that he suffered an adverse
employment action or was subject to a hostile work environment or constructively
discharged.  See id. at *8–13.  The Court noted that Dr. Clayton failed to show that
similarly situated members of other races were treated more favorably than he was, or
that there was any discriminatory or retaliatory motive behind the Hospital’s or Dr.
Shemo’s actions.  See id.
The Court reaffirmed its conclusions in a denial of Dr. Clayton’s motion for
reconsideration in June 2007.  See App. at 4a–20a.  Dr. Clayton thereafter timely
appealed.
II.
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  We have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  When the District Court grants a motion for summary judgment,
our review is plenary.  See Elsmere Park Club, L.P. v. Town of Elsmere, 542 F.3d 412,
416 (3d Cir. 2008).  Summary judgment is appropriate when no genuine issues of
material fact exist and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  See
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986).  We resolve all factual doubts and
5draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.  See DL Res., Inc. v.
FirstEngergy Solutions Corp., 506 F.3d 209, 216 (3d Cir. 2007).
III.
Dr. Clayton argues that the District Court erred in concluding that (1) his Title VII
on-call-hours claim was time barred, (2) he had not presented sufficient evidence of
discrimination or retaliatory behavior to defeat summary judgment on his individual
discrimination allegation, and (3) he could not establish a claim for a hostile work
environment or constructive discharge.
We consider first whether the District Court erred in determining that Dr.
Clayton’s claim that the Hospital reduced his on-call time for discriminatory reasons was
time barred.  Title VII requires a claimant to file a charge with the EEOC within 300 days
of the allegedly unlawful employment practice.  See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1).  The
Court found that Dr. Clayton’s claim of discrimination regarding his on-call time accrued
in October 1999 and was barred after June 2000—nine months before his March 2001
filing with the EEOC.  See Clayton, 2007 WL 575677, at *13.  Dr. Clayton retorts that his
allotment of reduced hours represented a continuing violation that did not accrue until his
departure from the Hospital in 2003.  He explains that “this is a ‘paycheck’ case, and
every discriminatory paycheck represents a violation of Title VII.”  Clayton’s Br. at 16;
see also id. at 44–45 (citing Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 395–96 (1986)).  We
disagree.
The Supreme Court’s recent opinion in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,
6Inc., 550 U.S. 618, ___, 127 S.Ct. 2162, 2166–72 (2007), forecloses the argument that
each paycheck Dr. Clayton received constituted a new and separate violation of Title VII. 
The Court in Ledbetter stated that “[a] new violation does not occur, and a new charging
period does not commence, upon the occurrence of subsequent nondiscriminatory acts
that entail adverse effects resulting from past discrimination.”  Id. at 2169.  The Hospital
made the decision to reduce Dr. Clayton’s—and all other part-time physicians’—on-call
time in October 1999.  See Clayton, 2007 WL 575677, at *13.  This was a discrete
employment decision, about which Dr. Clayton complained to his superiors but did not
file a timely EEOC complaint.  See Clayton’s Br. at 42.  He thus forfeited his opportunity
to file a Title VII complaint regarding his allocation of on-call time, and he cannot now
rely on his paychecks to “breathe life into prior, uncharged discrimination.”  Ledbetter,
127 S.Ct. at 2169; see also Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 110–14
(2002). 
We next review the merits of Dr. Clayton’s individual discrimination claims.  To
establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination or retaliation under Title VII, § 1981,
or the PHRA, a claimant must, among other things, demonstrate that he was subject to an
adverse employment action.  See Jones v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 198 F.3d 403, 410–11 (3d
Cir. 1999).  The District Court held that Dr. Clayton failed to satisfy this requirement
because he did not show that he suffered an “action by [his] employer that [was] serious
and tangible enough to alter [his] compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of
employment.”  Clayton, 2007 WL 575677, at *8 (quoting Storey v. Burns Int’l Sec.
7Servs., 390 F.3d 760, 764 (3d Cir. 2004) (internal quotations omitted)).  Our reading of
the record confirms that Dr. Clayton is unable to prove that he was subjected to a
discriminatory or retaliatory employment action through any of the individual incidents
recounted in his claim.  We thus have nothing to add to the District Court’s thorough
analysis, see Clayton, 2007 WL 575677, at *8–12; App. at 7a–15a, and we affirm its
determination that Dr. Clayton has not raised issues of material fact necessary to survive a
motion for summary judgment.  See O’Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers, Corp., 517 U.S.
308 312 (1996).
We conclude by considering the District Court’s rejection of Dr. Clayton’s hostile
work environment and constructive discharge claims.  To prevail on a hostile work
environment claim under Title VII and the PHRA, Dr. Clayton must show that (1) he
suffered intentional discrimination because of his race, (2) the discrimination was severe
or pervasive, (3) this detrimentally affected him, (4) it would have detrimentally affected
a reasonable person in like circumstances, and (5) a basis for employer liability is present. 
See Jensen v. Potter, 435 F.3d 444, 449 (3d Cir. 2006).  Viewing all of the facts in the
light most favorable to Dr. Clayton, we conclude that he cannot satisfy this showing
because there is no evidence that he suffered intentional discrimination because of his
race or that such discrimination was severe or pervasive.  The record has nine alleged
incidents of discrimination spread over a five-year period.  None of these incidents was
severe or pervasive in nature, and none was shown by Dr. Clayton to have been racially
motivated.  Accordingly, the District Court was correct to deny Dr. Clayton’s hostile
8work environment claim.
To establish constructive discharge, Dr. Clayton must show that “the employer
knowingly permitted conditions of discrimination in employment so intolerable that a
reasonable person subject to them would resign.”  Aman v. Cort Furniture Rental Corp.,
85 F.3d 1074, 1084 (3d Cir. 1996) (internal quotations omitted).  Because Dr. Clayton has
failed to present any evidence of racial discrimination, however, he cannot satisfy this
requirement.  The District Court thus properly granted summary judgment on this claim
as well.  Cf. Clowes v. Allegheny Valley Hosp., 991 F.2d 1159, 1161–62 (3d Cir. 1993)
(holding that objective proof of discrimination is required to sustain an allegation of
constructive discharge)
IV. 
For these reasons, we affirm the District Court’s grant of summary judgment.
